对特许权使用费征税

Steffen Juranek, Dirk Schindler, Guttorm Schjelderup
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引用次数: 2

摘要

数字经济的特点是使用知识产权,如软件、专利和商标。这种无形资产的定价被广泛用于将利润转移到低税收国家。我们分析了源税对滥用转让定价的特许权使用费支付的作用,以及最优税收政策。首先,我们发现特许权使用费的错误定价并不影响跨国公司的投资行为。其次,在绝大多数情况下,政府将源税设定为与企业税率相等的税率并不是最优的。原因是,关闭滥用转让定价活动需要与减轻资本投资中的企业税收扭曲相权衡。后者可以通过特许权使用费的某些税收减免来实现。如果真正的公平转让价格等于零,或者对于同样对待债务和股权的特殊公司税制度(例如,对于ACE和CBIT),将两种税率相等是最理想的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Taxing Royalty Payments
The digital economy is characterized by the use of intellectual property such as software, patents and trademarks. The pricing of such intangibles is widely used to shift profits to low-tax countries. We analyze the role of a source tax on royalty payments for abusive transfer pricing, and optimal tax policy. First, we show that mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment behavior by multinationals. Second, it is in the vast majority of cases not optimal for a government to set the source tax equal to the corporate tax rate. The reason is that shutting down abusive transfer pricing activities needs to be traded off against mitigating the corporate tax distortion in capital investment. The latter can be achieved by some tax deductibility of royalty payments. If the true arm's length transfer price equals zero or for special corporate tax systems that treat debt and equity alike (i.e., for ACE and CBIT), it will be optimal to equate both tax rates.
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