{"title":"知识产权动态分析","authors":"Jonathan M. Barnett","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter proposes a dynamic approach to IP analysis that assesses the effects of changes in the strength of IP rights by anticipating firms’ ability to adopt alternative non-IP mechanisms for capturing returns on innovation. Some of the most powerful non-IP alternatives are the economies of scale, financing capacities, and accumulated goodwill that are inherent to older, larger, and more integrated entities. By contrast, these non-IP alternatives are generally unavailable to younger, smaller, and less integrated entities. These entity-specific differences in adopting non-IP alternatives imply that changes in the strength of IP rights can have significantly different effects on different entity types as a function of age, size, and level of integration. Critically, weak- or zero-IP regimes can advantage large incumbents by compelling exit or deterring entry by smaller and less integrated firms that cannot sufficiently monetize R&D investments in the absence of reasonably secure IP protections.","PeriodicalId":143182,"journal":{"name":"Innovators, Firms, and Markets","volume":"326 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dynamic Analysis of Intellectual Property\",\"authors\":\"Jonathan M. Barnett\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter proposes a dynamic approach to IP analysis that assesses the effects of changes in the strength of IP rights by anticipating firms’ ability to adopt alternative non-IP mechanisms for capturing returns on innovation. Some of the most powerful non-IP alternatives are the economies of scale, financing capacities, and accumulated goodwill that are inherent to older, larger, and more integrated entities. By contrast, these non-IP alternatives are generally unavailable to younger, smaller, and less integrated entities. These entity-specific differences in adopting non-IP alternatives imply that changes in the strength of IP rights can have significantly different effects on different entity types as a function of age, size, and level of integration. Critically, weak- or zero-IP regimes can advantage large incumbents by compelling exit or deterring entry by smaller and less integrated firms that cannot sufficiently monetize R&D investments in the absence of reasonably secure IP protections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143182,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Innovators, Firms, and Markets\",\"volume\":\"326 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Innovators, Firms, and Markets\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Innovators, Firms, and Markets","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter proposes a dynamic approach to IP analysis that assesses the effects of changes in the strength of IP rights by anticipating firms’ ability to adopt alternative non-IP mechanisms for capturing returns on innovation. Some of the most powerful non-IP alternatives are the economies of scale, financing capacities, and accumulated goodwill that are inherent to older, larger, and more integrated entities. By contrast, these non-IP alternatives are generally unavailable to younger, smaller, and less integrated entities. These entity-specific differences in adopting non-IP alternatives imply that changes in the strength of IP rights can have significantly different effects on different entity types as a function of age, size, and level of integration. Critically, weak- or zero-IP regimes can advantage large incumbents by compelling exit or deterring entry by smaller and less integrated firms that cannot sufficiently monetize R&D investments in the absence of reasonably secure IP protections.