{"title":"奖金支付和参考点违规","authors":"Axel Ockenfels, Dirk Sliwka, Peter Werner","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.","PeriodicalId":331900,"journal":{"name":"IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"128","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations\",\"authors\":\"Axel Ockenfels, Dirk Sliwka, Peter Werner\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.\",\"PeriodicalId\":331900,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"128\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
