加拿大律师忠诚宪法化的错误开端(总检察长)诉加拿大法学会联合会案

Amy Salyzyn
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在加拿大(总检察长)诉加拿大律师协会联合会案中,加拿大最高法院的多数法官根据《加拿大权利和自由宪章》第7节承认了一项新的基本正义原则:律师有义务为委托人的事业作出承诺。本文在首先审查法院的理由及其背景之后,批评多数人选择承认这一新的基本正义原则。简而言之,有人认为将委托人承诺的义务提升为基本正义原则会导致第7条下的分析框架混乱,因为法律的合宪性试图通过一项原则来评估,该原则本身承认合法性是合法的边界。尽管律师应该是热心(或坚决)的辩护人这一观点得到了广泛认可,但人们一致认为,律师对委托人的承诺必须在法律规定的范围内履行。换句话说,热心倡导的概念本身并没有立足点来判断其他法律,因为这个概念仅仅因为这些法律的存在就把这些法律凌驾于它的要求和许可之上。我认为,当政府干预律师-客户关系时,捕捉利害关系的更好途径是将律师独立性作为基本正义的适用原则,并理解律师独立性仅为政府干预律师-客户关系辩护,其目的是保护或促进法律制度的完整性,以及律师在为客户提供适当途径方面的作用。如果政府希望监管律师以追求其他政策目标(例如,防止和发现洗钱和恐怖主义融资),并且该监管涉及律师的生命、自由或安全,则该监管应被视为违反第7条,政府追求这些其他目标的合法性应在第1条下考虑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a new principle of fundamental justice pursuant to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: a lawyer’s duty of commitment to a client’s cause. This article critiques the majority’s choice to recognize this new principle of fundamental justice after first reviewing the Court’s reasons and their background. In brief, it is argued that elevating a duty of client commitment to a principle of fundamental justice results in a muddled analytical framework under section 7 given that the constitutionality of a law is attempted to be evaluated by a principle that itself recognizes legality as a legitimate boundary. Although the idea that a lawyer ought to be a zealous (or resolute) advocate is well-recognized, there is agreement that a lawyer's commitment to a client must be exercised within the limits of the law. Stated otherwise, there is no foothold in the concept of zealous advocacy itself from which to adjudge other laws, as the concept takes such laws to trump its requirements and permissions, merely due to their existence. I argue that a better route to capturing what is at stake when the government intrudes on the lawyer-client relationship is to use independence of the bar as the applicable principle of fundamental justice and to understand independence of the bar to only justify those government intrusions on the lawyer-client relationship that are directed to protecting or promoting the integrity of the legal system and the lawyer’s role in providing clients appropriate access to the legal system. To the extent that the government wishes to regulate lawyers in order to pursue other policy ends (like, for example, preventing and detecting money laundering and terrorist financing) and the regulation engages the lawyer’s life, liberty or security, the regulation should be viewed as a violation of section 7 and the legitimacy of the government’s pursuit of these other ends be considered under section 1.
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