{"title":"MR-PDP:多副本可证明的数据占有","authors":"Reza Curtmola, O. Khan, R. Burns, G. Ateniese","doi":"10.1109/ICDCS.2008.68","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many storage systems rely on replication to increase the availability and durability of data on untrusted storage systems. At present, such storage systems provide no strong evidence that multiple copies of the data are actually stored. Storage servers can collude to make it look like they are storing many copies of the data, whereas in reality they only store a single copy. We address this shortcoming through multiple-replica provable data possession (MR-PDP): A provably-secure scheme that allows a client that stores t replicas of a file in a storage system to verify through a challenge-response protocol that (1) each unique replica can be produced at the time of the challenge and that (2) the storage system uses t times the storage required to store a single replica. MR-PDP extends previous work on data possession proofs for a single copy of a file in a client/server storage system (Ateniese et al., 2007). Using MR-PDP to store t replicas is computationally much more efficient than using a single-replica PDP scheme to store t separate, unrelated files (e.g., by encrypting each file separately prior to storing it). Another advantage of MR-PDP is that it can generate further replicas on demand, at little expense, when some of the existing replicas fail.","PeriodicalId":240205,"journal":{"name":"2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"569","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"MR-PDP: Multiple-Replica Provable Data Possession\",\"authors\":\"Reza Curtmola, O. Khan, R. Burns, G. Ateniese\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICDCS.2008.68\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many storage systems rely on replication to increase the availability and durability of data on untrusted storage systems. At present, such storage systems provide no strong evidence that multiple copies of the data are actually stored. Storage servers can collude to make it look like they are storing many copies of the data, whereas in reality they only store a single copy. We address this shortcoming through multiple-replica provable data possession (MR-PDP): A provably-secure scheme that allows a client that stores t replicas of a file in a storage system to verify through a challenge-response protocol that (1) each unique replica can be produced at the time of the challenge and that (2) the storage system uses t times the storage required to store a single replica. MR-PDP extends previous work on data possession proofs for a single copy of a file in a client/server storage system (Ateniese et al., 2007). Using MR-PDP to store t replicas is computationally much more efficient than using a single-replica PDP scheme to store t separate, unrelated files (e.g., by encrypting each file separately prior to storing it). Another advantage of MR-PDP is that it can generate further replicas on demand, at little expense, when some of the existing replicas fail.\",\"PeriodicalId\":240205,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"volume\":\"125 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-06-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"569\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2008.68\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2008.68","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 569
摘要
许多存储系统依靠复制来提高不可信存储系统上数据的可用性和持久性。目前,这样的存储系统并没有提供强有力的证据证明实际上存储了数据的多个副本。存储服务器可以相互勾结,使其看起来像是在存储数据的多个副本,而实际上它们只存储一个副本。我们通过多副本可证明的数据占有(MR-PDP)解决了这个缺点:一个可证明的安全方案,允许在存储系统中存储文件的t个副本的客户端通过挑战-响应协议验证:(1)每个唯一副本可以在挑战时产生,(2)存储系统使用t倍存储单个副本所需的存储空间。MR-PDP扩展了以前在客户端/服务器存储系统中文件的单个副本的数据占有证明方面的工作(Ateniese et al., 2007)。使用MR-PDP存储t个副本比使用单副本PDP方案存储t个独立的、不相关的文件(例如,在存储每个文件之前分别加密)在计算上要高效得多。MR-PDP的另一个优点是,当一些现有的副本失败时,它可以按需生成更多的副本,而且花费很少。
Many storage systems rely on replication to increase the availability and durability of data on untrusted storage systems. At present, such storage systems provide no strong evidence that multiple copies of the data are actually stored. Storage servers can collude to make it look like they are storing many copies of the data, whereas in reality they only store a single copy. We address this shortcoming through multiple-replica provable data possession (MR-PDP): A provably-secure scheme that allows a client that stores t replicas of a file in a storage system to verify through a challenge-response protocol that (1) each unique replica can be produced at the time of the challenge and that (2) the storage system uses t times the storage required to store a single replica. MR-PDP extends previous work on data possession proofs for a single copy of a file in a client/server storage system (Ateniese et al., 2007). Using MR-PDP to store t replicas is computationally much more efficient than using a single-replica PDP scheme to store t separate, unrelated files (e.g., by encrypting each file separately prior to storing it). Another advantage of MR-PDP is that it can generate further replicas on demand, at little expense, when some of the existing replicas fail.