探讨BAN方法在协议分析中的应用

Proceedings. 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1991-05-20 DOI:10.1109/RISP.1991.130785

E. Snekkenes

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引用次数: 42

摘要

BAN分析密码协议的方法(M. Burrows等人，1988)将正确性要求转换为形式信念逻辑的证明义务。结果表明，BAN协议注释规则的缺陷仅仅是由于协议步长排列造成的，BAN逻辑无法检测到。用一个简短的例子来说明这一点。以BAN逻辑的形式，定义了终止理想化协议的概念。BAN逻辑已被用于证明不安全协议的正确性(D. Nessett, 1990)。作者证明该协议属于非终止协议类。

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Exploring the BAN approach to protocol analysis

The BAN approach to analysis of cryptographic protocols (M. Burrows et al., 1988) transforms a correctness requirement into a proof obligation of a formal belief logic. It is shown that the BAN protocol annotation rules make flaws due solely to protocol step permutation undetectable by the BAN logic. This is illustrated by a short example. In the style of BAN logic, the author defines the concept of a terminating idealized protocol. BAN logic has been used to prove the correctness of an insecure protocol (D. Nessett, 1990). The author shows that this protocol belongs to the class of nonterminating protocols.<>

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Proceedings. 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy

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