摆脱发行人支付不会提高信用评级

Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-09-15 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3710178

Douglas J. Lucas

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摘要

批评信用评级机构“发行者支付收入”做法的人士表示，这种做法允许债券发行者和安排者在评级机构中挑选最高评级。他们声称，这种“评级购物”激励评级机构通过将债务评级高于实际信用风险担保的水平来赢得业务。为了消除虚高的评级，批评“发行者付费”的人士建议，禁止债券发行者选择并支付评级机构的费用。批评“发行者付费”的人认为，只有消除了“发行者付费”对夸大评级的激励，评级才会准确。但我们记录了对这一假设的历史测试，当发行者支付和评级购买是无关紧要的问题时，评级仍然高得不合适。由于2007-09年的发行量实际上为零，标普没有商业动机维持对次级抵押贷款支持证券和由次级抵押贷款支持证券支持的债务抵押债券的过高评级。然而，与市场价格和市场观察人士的信用分析相比，标普的评级被严重夸大了。由于2007-09年的情况仍导致次级债评级虚高，取消发行人薪酬也不足以提高评级机构的准确性。但是，如果“发行者付费”的批评者成功地废除了税收惯例，这将只是评级机构监管无效和适得其反的漫长历史中的最新一例。

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Getting Rid of Issuer-Pay Will Not Improve Credit Ratings

Critics of credit rating agencies’ issuer-pay revenue practice say that it allows debt issuers and arrangers to shop among agencies for the highest rating. They allege that such “rating shopping” incents rating agencies to win business by rating debt higher than warranted by actual credit risk. To eliminate inflated ratings, issuer-pay critics suggest barring debt issuers from selecting and paying rating agencies.

Issuer-pay critics assume that ratings would be accurate if only the issuer-pay incentive for inflated ratings was extinguished. But we document a historical test of this assumption, an instance when issuer-pay and rating shopping were irrelevant concerns and ratings were still inappropriately high. With issuance effectively zero in 2007-09, S&P had no commercial incentive to maintain inflated ratings on subprime mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Yet, S&P’s ratings were severely inflated when compared to market prices and the credit analyses of market observers. Because 2007-09 conditions still produced inflated subprime ratings, getting rid of issuer pay will also not be sufficient to improve rating agency accuracy. But if issuer-pay critics succeed in abolishing the revenue practice, it would only be the latest in a long history of ineffectual and counter-productive rating agency regulations.

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Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal

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