{"title":"用于IP安全的硬件沙盒自动生成工具","authors":"Taylor J. L. Whitaker, C. Bobda","doi":"10.1109/FCCM.2017.54","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a design flow for automatic generation of hardware sandboxes. Our tool, the Component Authentication Process for Sandboxed Layouts (CAPSL), generates sandboxes capable of detecting trojan activation and nullifying potential damage to a system at run-time. Our approach captures the behavioral properties of non-trusted IPs with formal models that are translated to checker automata and implemented within a untrusted partition of the system to isolate sandbox-system interactions upon deviation from the behavioral checkers.","PeriodicalId":124631,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE 25th Annual International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CAPSL: A Tool for Automatic Generation of Hardware Sandboxes for IP Security\",\"authors\":\"Taylor J. L. Whitaker, C. Bobda\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/FCCM.2017.54\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a design flow for automatic generation of hardware sandboxes. Our tool, the Component Authentication Process for Sandboxed Layouts (CAPSL), generates sandboxes capable of detecting trojan activation and nullifying potential damage to a system at run-time. Our approach captures the behavioral properties of non-trusted IPs with formal models that are translated to checker automata and implemented within a untrusted partition of the system to isolate sandbox-system interactions upon deviation from the behavioral checkers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":124631,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 IEEE 25th Annual International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM)\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 IEEE 25th Annual International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/FCCM.2017.54\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 IEEE 25th Annual International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FCCM.2017.54","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
CAPSL: A Tool for Automatic Generation of Hardware Sandboxes for IP Security
We propose a design flow for automatic generation of hardware sandboxes. Our tool, the Component Authentication Process for Sandboxed Layouts (CAPSL), generates sandboxes capable of detecting trojan activation and nullifying potential damage to a system at run-time. Our approach captures the behavioral properties of non-trusted IPs with formal models that are translated to checker automata and implemented within a untrusted partition of the system to isolate sandbox-system interactions upon deviation from the behavioral checkers.