室内超宽带定位开放平台的安全评估:确认攻击案例研究

Baptiste Pestourie, V. Beroulle, N. Fourty
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引用次数: 3

摘要

室内定位是物联网(IoT)的一个不断发展的领域,用于各种敏感应用,如制造链优化或基于位置的认证。定位协议依赖于传输信号的物理属性,例如飞行时间或接收信号强度,这些属性可以被各种类型的攻击改变或模拟。因此,传统的加密技术无法保证这些定位协议的安全性。大多数现成的定位平台都没有解决与定位相关的缺陷。此外,设计人员对本地化链中涉及的各种协议、过滤器和算法的访问有限,这对提出安全解决方案构成了相当大的障碍。本文提出了一个名为SecureLoc的原型平台,在每一层都开放,用于评估基于超宽带脉冲响应(UWB-IR)技术的安全室内定位方法,考虑到物联网的成本和集成限制。我们通过欺骗确认攻击的案例研究展示了SecureLoc在安全评估和对策方面的潜力。提出了一种新的攻击分析和评价方法。评估了SecureLoc定位链对这种攻击的鲁棒性。本文还提供了对这种攻击的未来增强和可能的低成本对策的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Security Evaluation with an Indoor UWB Localization Open Platform: Acknowledgment Attack Case Study
Indoor localization is a growing field of the Internet of Things (IoT) which is used in various sensitive applications such as manufacturing chain optimization or location-based authentication. Localization protocols rely on physical properties of the transmitted signals, such as Time-of-Flight or Received Signal Strength, which can be altered or impersonated by various types of attacks. Therefore, classical encryption techniques cannot guarantee the security of these localization protocols. Most off-the-shelf positioning platforms do not address the flaws related to localization. In addition, designers have a limited access to the various protocols, filters and algorithms involved in the localization chain, which poses a considerable obstacle to propose security solutions. This paper presents a prototyping platform called SecureLoc, open at every layer, for evaluating secure indoor localization methods based on Ultra-Wide Band Impulse Response (UWB-IR) technology, with respect to the cost and integration constraints of the IoT. We show the potential of SecureLoc for security evaluation and countermeasures through the case study of a spoofed acknowledgment attack. A novel analysis and evaluation of this attack is proposed. The robustness of SecureLoc localization chain against this attack is evaluated. Insights on future enhancements of this attack and possible low-cost countermeasures are provided.
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