{"title":"室内超宽带定位开放平台的安全评估:确认攻击案例研究","authors":"Baptiste Pestourie, V. Beroulle, N. Fourty","doi":"10.1109/PIMRC.2019.8904224","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Indoor localization is a growing field of the Internet of Things (IoT) which is used in various sensitive applications such as manufacturing chain optimization or location-based authentication. Localization protocols rely on physical properties of the transmitted signals, such as Time-of-Flight or Received Signal Strength, which can be altered or impersonated by various types of attacks. Therefore, classical encryption techniques cannot guarantee the security of these localization protocols. Most off-the-shelf positioning platforms do not address the flaws related to localization. In addition, designers have a limited access to the various protocols, filters and algorithms involved in the localization chain, which poses a considerable obstacle to propose security solutions. This paper presents a prototyping platform called SecureLoc, open at every layer, for evaluating secure indoor localization methods based on Ultra-Wide Band Impulse Response (UWB-IR) technology, with respect to the cost and integration constraints of the IoT. We show the potential of SecureLoc for security evaluation and countermeasures through the case study of a spoofed acknowledgment attack. A novel analysis and evaluation of this attack is proposed. The robustness of SecureLoc localization chain against this attack is evaluated. Insights on future enhancements of this attack and possible low-cost countermeasures are provided.","PeriodicalId":412182,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE 30th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Security Evaluation with an Indoor UWB Localization Open Platform: Acknowledgment Attack Case Study\",\"authors\":\"Baptiste Pestourie, V. Beroulle, N. Fourty\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/PIMRC.2019.8904224\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Indoor localization is a growing field of the Internet of Things (IoT) which is used in various sensitive applications such as manufacturing chain optimization or location-based authentication. Localization protocols rely on physical properties of the transmitted signals, such as Time-of-Flight or Received Signal Strength, which can be altered or impersonated by various types of attacks. Therefore, classical encryption techniques cannot guarantee the security of these localization protocols. Most off-the-shelf positioning platforms do not address the flaws related to localization. In addition, designers have a limited access to the various protocols, filters and algorithms involved in the localization chain, which poses a considerable obstacle to propose security solutions. This paper presents a prototyping platform called SecureLoc, open at every layer, for evaluating secure indoor localization methods based on Ultra-Wide Band Impulse Response (UWB-IR) technology, with respect to the cost and integration constraints of the IoT. We show the potential of SecureLoc for security evaluation and countermeasures through the case study of a spoofed acknowledgment attack. A novel analysis and evaluation of this attack is proposed. The robustness of SecureLoc localization chain against this attack is evaluated. Insights on future enhancements of this attack and possible low-cost countermeasures are provided.\",\"PeriodicalId\":412182,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE 30th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)\",\"volume\":\"61 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE 30th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/PIMRC.2019.8904224\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE 30th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/PIMRC.2019.8904224","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Security Evaluation with an Indoor UWB Localization Open Platform: Acknowledgment Attack Case Study
Indoor localization is a growing field of the Internet of Things (IoT) which is used in various sensitive applications such as manufacturing chain optimization or location-based authentication. Localization protocols rely on physical properties of the transmitted signals, such as Time-of-Flight or Received Signal Strength, which can be altered or impersonated by various types of attacks. Therefore, classical encryption techniques cannot guarantee the security of these localization protocols. Most off-the-shelf positioning platforms do not address the flaws related to localization. In addition, designers have a limited access to the various protocols, filters and algorithms involved in the localization chain, which poses a considerable obstacle to propose security solutions. This paper presents a prototyping platform called SecureLoc, open at every layer, for evaluating secure indoor localization methods based on Ultra-Wide Band Impulse Response (UWB-IR) technology, with respect to the cost and integration constraints of the IoT. We show the potential of SecureLoc for security evaluation and countermeasures through the case study of a spoofed acknowledgment attack. A novel analysis and evaluation of this attack is proposed. The robustness of SecureLoc localization chain against this attack is evaluated. Insights on future enhancements of this attack and possible low-cost countermeasures are provided.