Herbert Hart’s Theory of Definition in the Context of Analytical Legal Philosophy

The article presents Herbert Hart’s theory of definition in the context of modern analytical legal philosophy. Dissatisfaction with the applicability of the traditional method of definition by the genus and differentia to the elucidation of legal concepts led Hart to the development a new method of definition. It is shown that Hart not only modifies the paraphrase of Jeremy Bentham, but also tries to adapt to the analysis of legal concepts the definition in use borrowed from analytical philosophers and logicians. It has been established that the key point of Hart’s method is that instead of defining a separate term, it is necessary to consider a statement, where the utterance plays a characteristic role, and is explained by specifying the conditions under which the entire statement is true. Some difficulties that arise when one uses this definition in the framework of the truth-conditional semantics are considered. In particular, it is shown that Hart uses open sentences of the form “X has a right” in its definition, which differ from closed sentences, primarily because they contain free variables with indefinite range of values. This uncertainty does not allow us to attribute to them the truth-value. The concepts of truth and falsity apply only to statements that are expressed by closed sentences. Thus, Hart’s claim of a special semantic nature of legal concepts and a special epistemological task of definitions in jurisprudence is reflected in his theory of the truth-conditional definition - a kind of contextual definition.