利用社会导向模型研究合作型社会的演化

Kan-Leung Cheng, Inon Zuckerman, U. Kuter, Dana S. Nau
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用进化博弈论来研究合作社会的进化和个体代理(即玩家)在这种社会中的行为。基于社会和行为科学的经验证据,我们提出了一个新的玩家模型,该模型指出:(1)个体的行为可能不仅受到自身利益的驱动,也受到对他人的影响;(2)个体的人际社会倾向是不同的,这反映了稳定的个人取向,影响了他们的选择。除了正式的玩家模型,我们还提供了一种分析,考虑了不同类型个体之间可能的互动,并确定了五种一般的稳态行为模式。我们提出的进化模拟证实了先前关于合作进化的发现,并为社会中合作行为的进化过程以及合作社会的出现提供了新的见解。我们的主要实验结果表明,与之前的常识相比,囚徒困境博弈中增加相互奖励或相互惩罚不会产生相同类型的合作社会:增加奖励会增加社会的合作水平,而增加相互惩罚不会增加社会的合作水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Using a Social Orientation Model for the Evolution of Cooperative Societies
We utilize evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of cooperative societies and the behaviors of individual agents (i.e., players) in such societies. We present a novel player model based upon empirical evidence from the social and behavioral sciences stating that: (1) an individual’s behavior may often be motivated not only by self-interest but also by the consequences for others, and (2) individuals vary in their interpersonal social tendencies, which reflect stable personal orientations that influence their choices. Alongside the formal player model we provide an analysis that considers possible interactions between different types of individuals and identifies five general steady-state behavioral patterns. We present evolutionary simulations that ratify previous findings on evolution of cooperation, and provide new insights on the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a society as well as on the emergence of cooperative societies. Our main experimental result demonstrates that in contrast to previous common knowledge, increasing mutual reward or mutual punishment in the Prisoner’s dilemma game does not result in the same type of cooperative society: while increasing reward does increase the society’s cooperativeness level, increasing mutual punishment does not.
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