PRIME:用于无内存加密的私有RSA基础设施

Behrad Garmany, Tilo Müller
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引用次数: 42

摘要

冷启动攻击利用了RAM中的数据随着时间逐渐消失的事实,而不是在断电时立即丢失。攻击者可以通过重新启动或短暂关闭系统电源(即所谓的冷启动)来访问所有内存内容。因此,RAM中的敏感数据(如加密密钥)暴露给具有物理访问权限的攻击者。近年来的研究发现了基于软件的冷启动问题解决方案,涉及cpu限制或无内存加密。然而,到目前为止,焦点集中在对称密码上,特别是关于磁盘加密系统。与此相反,目前的工作旨在缩小与非对称密码的差距。通过PRIME,我们为私有RSA操作提供了一个抗冷启动的基础结构。所有私有RSA参数都对称地加密在RAM中,并且只能在CPU寄存器中解密。RSA的模幂算法完全在CPU上实现,因此RSA的任何敏感状态都不会进入RAM。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
PRIME: private RSA infrastructure for memory-less encryption
Cold boot attacks exploit the fact that data in RAM gradually fades away over time, rather than being lost immediately when power is cycled off. An attacker can gain access to all memory contents by a restart or short power-down of the system, a so called cold boot. Consequently, sensitive data in RAM like cryptographic keys are exposed to attackers with physical access. Research in recent years found software-based solutions to the cold boot problem in terms of CPU-bound or memory-less encryption. To date, however, the focus has been set on symmetric ciphers, particularly concerning disk encryption systems. Contrary to that, the work in hand aims to close the gap to asymmetric ciphers. With PRIME, we present a cold boot resistant infrastructure for private RSA operations. All private RSA parameters reside symmetrically encrypted in RAM and are decrypted only within CPU registers. The modular exponentiation algorithm for RSA is implemented entirely on the CPU, such that no sensitive state of RSA ever goes to RAM.
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