{"title":"十年来利用视觉模拟域名攻击公司","authors":"Geoffrey Simpson, T. Moore, R. Clayton","doi":"10.1109/eCrime51433.2020.9493251","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We identify over a quarter of a million domains used by medium and large companies within the .com registry. We find that for around 7% of these companies very similar domain names have been registered with character changes that are intended to be indistinguishable at a casual glance. These domains would be suitable for use in Business Email Compromise frauds. Using historical registration and name server data we identify the timing, rate, and movement of these look-alike domains over a ten year period. This allows us to identify clusters of registrations which are quite clearly malicious and show how the criminals have moved their activity over time in response to countermeasures. Although the malicious activity peaked in 2016, there is still sufficient ongoing activity to cause concern.","PeriodicalId":103272,"journal":{"name":"2020 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ten years of attacks on companies using visual impersonation of domain names\",\"authors\":\"Geoffrey Simpson, T. Moore, R. Clayton\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/eCrime51433.2020.9493251\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We identify over a quarter of a million domains used by medium and large companies within the .com registry. We find that for around 7% of these companies very similar domain names have been registered with character changes that are intended to be indistinguishable at a casual glance. These domains would be suitable for use in Business Email Compromise frauds. Using historical registration and name server data we identify the timing, rate, and movement of these look-alike domains over a ten year period. This allows us to identify clusters of registrations which are quite clearly malicious and show how the criminals have moved their activity over time in response to countermeasures. Although the malicious activity peaked in 2016, there is still sufficient ongoing activity to cause concern.\",\"PeriodicalId\":103272,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/eCrime51433.2020.9493251\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research (eCrime)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/eCrime51433.2020.9493251","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Ten years of attacks on companies using visual impersonation of domain names
We identify over a quarter of a million domains used by medium and large companies within the .com registry. We find that for around 7% of these companies very similar domain names have been registered with character changes that are intended to be indistinguishable at a casual glance. These domains would be suitable for use in Business Email Compromise frauds. Using historical registration and name server data we identify the timing, rate, and movement of these look-alike domains over a ten year period. This allows us to identify clusters of registrations which are quite clearly malicious and show how the criminals have moved their activity over time in response to countermeasures. Although the malicious activity peaked in 2016, there is still sufficient ongoing activity to cause concern.