第六专员

Nadelle Grossman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

联邦证券法赋予证券交易委员会(SEC)广泛的规则制定权力。在颁布规则时,SEC不仅要确保其规则保护投资者和公众利益,还要考虑其规则对效率、竞争和资本形成的影响(ECCF授权)。然而,美国证交会的规则制定机构最近遭遇挫折。在两项推翻SEC规则的决定中,华盛顿特区巡回法院认为,ECCF的授权需要进行定量的成本效益分析。这与证交会以往定性评估其规则效果的做法形成了鲜明对比。虽然这些dc巡回法院的决定被批评对SEC的规则制定采用了不适当的高标准审查,但本文指出了这些决定的一个更根本的问题:它们干扰了SEC管理证券法的权力。这种干涉破坏了行政法原则,而行政法原则是政府三权分立的核心。在《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank act)和《就业法案》(JOBS act)规定SEC必须通过众多规则的背景下,要求SEC在制定规则时进行定量分析尤其令人不安。这些分析肯定无法捕捉到证交会规则的不可量化影响,比如它们对企业创造财富的战略管理流程的影响。出于这些原因,本文敦促美国证券交易委员会根据证券法行使其权力,并以最好地捕捉其规则的全部影响的方式发布对ECCF授权的明确解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Sixth Commissioner
The federal securities laws grant broad rulemaking authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In promulgating rules, the SEC must not only ensure that its rules protect investors and the public interest, but also consider the effects of its rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation (the ECCF mandate).However, the SEC’s rulemaking authority has recently been frustrated. In two decisions striking down SEC rules, the D.C. Circuit held that the ECCF mandate requires a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. This contrasts with the SEC’s historic practice of qualitatively assessing the effects of its rules.While these D.C. Circuit decisions have been criticized for applying an inappropriately high standard of review to SEC rulemaking, this article identifies a more fundamental problem with these decisions: they interfere with the SEC’s power to administer the securities laws. This interference frustrates administrative law principles that lie at the heart of the division of power among the three branches of government.Requiring the SEC to engage in a quantitative analysis in rulemaking is especially troubling in a context where the SEC must pass numerous rules under the Dodd-Frank and JOBS Acts. These analyses will surely fail to capture the unquantifiable effects of SEC rules, such as their effect on firm wealth-creating strategic management processes. For these reasons, this article urges the SEC to exert its authority under securities laws and issue an explicit interpretation of the ECCF mandate in a way that best captures the full impact of its rules.
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