小额信贷的行为基础:来自印度农村的实验和调查证据

Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, J. Morduch
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引用次数: 295

摘要

小额信贷是一种创新的金融工具,旨在减少贫困和解决信贷市场的不完善问题。我们使用时间贴现和风险厌恶的实验措施,在印度南部的村民突出小额信贷的行为特征。有条件地从任何来源借款,具有当前偏好的妇女比其他人更有可能通过小额信贷机构借款。小额信贷合同要求定期、固定分期偿还贷款,并利用同行的压力来鼓励纪律。这些创新反映了储蓄行为方法中突出的机制,表明小额信贷的流行部分源于典型贷款机制中缺乏的鼓励和自律模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural India
Microcredit is an innovative financial tool designed to reduce poverty and fix credit market imperfections. We use experimental measures of time discounting and risk aversion for villagers in south India to highlight behavioral features of microcredit. Conditional on borrowing from any source, women with present-biased preferences are more likely than others to borrow through microcredit institutions. Microcredit contracts require loan repayments in regular, fixed installments and they harness peer pressure to encourage discipline. These innovations mirror mechanisms highlighted in behavioral approaches to saving, suggesting that microcredit's popularity stems partly from modes of encouragement and self-discipline absent in typical lending mechanisms.
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