支离破碎的信仰体系中的理性

Cristina Borgoni
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这一章讨论的问题是,哪一种理性概念最适合于认为我们大多是理性的信念的碎片图景。根据这幅图,一致性并不是整个信仰体系合理性的要求。只有在信念碎片中才合理地需要连贯性。然而,本章认为,碎片化仍然需要在信念碎片之间提供一个不同的理性标准,以解释我们会直观地将非理性归因于主体的各种情况。它提出证据响应性的要求是解释来自不同信念片段的信念之间存在某种规范性关系这一观点的一个很好的候选条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rationality in Fragmented Belief Systems
This chapter deals with the question of which notion of rationality best fits with a fragmentation picture of belief that holds that we are mostly rational. According to this picture, coherence is not a requirement of rationality for the entire belief system. Coherence is only rationally required within belief fragments. The chapter argues, however, that fragmentation still needs to offer a different rationality criterion across belief fragments to account for a variety of cases in which we would intuitively ascribe irrationality to the subject. It proposes that the requirement of evidence responsiveness is a good candidate for making sense of the idea that there are certain normative relations in place among beliefs from different belief fragments.
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