未折现的二人零和交流随机博弈

M. Baykal-Gursoy, Z. Avsar
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引用次数: 2

摘要

考虑在长期平均收益标准下,具有有限状态和有限行动空间的两人零和交流随机博弈。交流博弈在有限的策略空间中是不可约的,其中每一对行动都是正概率的。所提出的方法将Hoffman和Karp(1996)的算法应用于不可约博弈,在一系列受限策略空间上连续变大,直到获得任何/spl epsiv/>0的/spl epsiv/-最优平稳策略对。对于具有独立于初始状态的最优策略的博弈,该算法是收敛的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Undiscounted two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games
Consider two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games with finite state and finite action spaces under the long-run average payoff criterion. A communicating game is irreducible on a restricted strategy space where every pair of action is taken with positive probability. The proposed approach applies Hoffman and Karp's (1996) algorithm for irreducible games successively over a sequence of restricted strategy spaces that gets larger until an /spl epsiv/-optimal stationary policy pair is obtained for any /spl epsiv/>0. This algorithm is convergent for the games that have optimal strategies with a value independent of the initial state.
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