A. Rügamer, F. Garzia, D. Meister, J. R. V. D. Merwe, S. Taschke, Xabier Zubizarreta, F. Kunzi, Ricardo Monroy Gonzalez Plata, S. Urquijo, Christoph Miksovsky, W. Felber, J. Wendel
{"title":"Galileo PRS处理增强鲁棒性和抗欺骗性","authors":"A. Rügamer, F. Garzia, D. Meister, J. R. V. D. Merwe, S. Taschke, Xabier Zubizarreta, F. Kunzi, Ricardo Monroy Gonzalez Plata, S. Urquijo, Christoph Miksovsky, W. Felber, J. Wendel","doi":"10.23919/ENC48637.2020.9317344","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents and discusses some of the enhancements in robustness against jamming and spoofing using unique features of the cryptographically protected Galileo PRS signals. Different techniques exploiting these PRS properties have been implemented and evaluated on the German national PRS test receiver (PROOF). It is shown that the used HDDM interference mitigation method is already as good as the state-of-the-art in high-end GNSS receivers for OS signals. Then the benefits of cryptographically protected signals are discussed with a demonstration how trusted PRS signals can be used to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks also in comparison to one potential Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA) configuration.","PeriodicalId":157951,"journal":{"name":"2020 European Navigation Conference (ENC)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Enhanced Robustness and Spoofing Resistance by Galileo PRS Processing\",\"authors\":\"A. Rügamer, F. Garzia, D. Meister, J. R. V. D. Merwe, S. Taschke, Xabier Zubizarreta, F. Kunzi, Ricardo Monroy Gonzalez Plata, S. Urquijo, Christoph Miksovsky, W. Felber, J. Wendel\",\"doi\":\"10.23919/ENC48637.2020.9317344\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents and discusses some of the enhancements in robustness against jamming and spoofing using unique features of the cryptographically protected Galileo PRS signals. Different techniques exploiting these PRS properties have been implemented and evaluated on the German national PRS test receiver (PROOF). It is shown that the used HDDM interference mitigation method is already as good as the state-of-the-art in high-end GNSS receivers for OS signals. Then the benefits of cryptographically protected signals are discussed with a demonstration how trusted PRS signals can be used to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks also in comparison to one potential Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA) configuration.\",\"PeriodicalId\":157951,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 European Navigation Conference (ENC)\",\"volume\":\"58 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 European Navigation Conference (ENC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.23919/ENC48637.2020.9317344\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 European Navigation Conference (ENC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.23919/ENC48637.2020.9317344","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Enhanced Robustness and Spoofing Resistance by Galileo PRS Processing
This paper presents and discusses some of the enhancements in robustness against jamming and spoofing using unique features of the cryptographically protected Galileo PRS signals. Different techniques exploiting these PRS properties have been implemented and evaluated on the German national PRS test receiver (PROOF). It is shown that the used HDDM interference mitigation method is already as good as the state-of-the-art in high-end GNSS receivers for OS signals. Then the benefits of cryptographically protected signals are discussed with a demonstration how trusted PRS signals can be used to detect and mitigate spoofing attacks also in comparison to one potential Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA) configuration.