平台信誉系统设计:最优信息披露

Z. Shi, K. Srinivasan, Kaifu Zhang
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本文研究了信誉系统中信息披露的数量对平台利润的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Design of Platform Reputation Systems: Optimal Information Disclosure
This paper studies the amount of information disclosure in a reputation system that optimizes the platform’s profit.
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