上市公司年报调性管理与大股东减持的关系——以我们棕榈公司为例

Liang Chang, Yuzheng Zheng, Na Tan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

上市公司通过操纵信息披露中的情绪基调影响股价从而减持的案例研究在现有文献中很少见到。本文基于基调管理的视角,以上市公司OURPALM股份有限公司为例进行研究,发现游戏行业面临的外部竞争压力和并购积累的巨大商誉风险,使得大股东通过信息不对称的方式进行减持成为可能。大股东通过更乐观的年报信息和更亮眼的盈利业绩报告做出了操纵的基调。股价上涨后,大股东趁机减持。监管漏洞是内部人士通过语气操纵减持的最重要原因。研究表明,在信息不对称条件下,公司有很强的动机通过主动信息披露来操纵市场时机,以满足自身利益。监管部门要在信息披露、减持监管等方面多管齐下,更好地保护中小投资者,促进资本健康发展
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Relations between Annual Report Tone Management and Major Shareholder Reduction of Listed Company—A Case Study Based on Ourpalm Company
Case studies on listed companies influencing their stock price by manipulating the tone of sentiment in information disclosure thus to reduce the holdings are rarely seen in existing literature. Based on the perspective of tone management, this paper take OURPALM Co., Ltd. as a case study, which is a listed company, finding that the external competitive pressure faced by game industry and the huge goodwill risk accumulated by mergers make it possible for the majority shareholders to reduce the holdings through information asymmetry. The major shareholder made a tone of manipulation through the more optimistic annual report information and more bright earnings performance report. After raising the stock price, the major shareholders took the opportunity to reduce their holdings. The supervision loopholes are the most important reasons for the reduction of the holdings of internal people through tone manipulation. Studies have shown that under the condition of information asymmetry, the company has a strong motivation to manipulate the market timing through active information disclosure to satisfy its own interests. Regulators must take a multi-pronged approach in terms of information disclosure and regulations of reduction to achieve better protection of small and medium investors and a healthy development of the capital
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