{"title":"对亚洲建设-经营-转让私有化进程的批判","authors":"P. Handley","doi":"10.1080/02598272.1997.10800340","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the late 1980s the “build-operate-transfer” concession, or BOT, has become a popular option in Asia for infrastructural privatisation. The experiences of several years suggest that BOT schemes are by nature too complex and fragile, and too highly prone to politicisation, to enable governments in developing countries to achieve the quick, efficient, and privately financed supply of infrastructure as intended by this method of privatisation. Across Asia the number of unqualified BOT successes has been few. A much greater number of attempted projects has been characterised by lengthy delays, chronic disputes, and frequently, failure to ever get underway. Even in the case of those which do proceed, the state often fails to attain its principal goals.","PeriodicalId":333221,"journal":{"name":"The Asian Journal of Public Administration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Critical View of the Build-Operate-Transfer Privatisation Process in Asia\",\"authors\":\"P. Handley\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02598272.1997.10800340\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Since the late 1980s the “build-operate-transfer” concession, or BOT, has become a popular option in Asia for infrastructural privatisation. The experiences of several years suggest that BOT schemes are by nature too complex and fragile, and too highly prone to politicisation, to enable governments in developing countries to achieve the quick, efficient, and privately financed supply of infrastructure as intended by this method of privatisation. Across Asia the number of unqualified BOT successes has been few. A much greater number of attempted projects has been characterised by lengthy delays, chronic disputes, and frequently, failure to ever get underway. Even in the case of those which do proceed, the state often fails to attain its principal goals.\",\"PeriodicalId\":333221,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Asian Journal of Public Administration\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1997-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"21\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Asian Journal of Public Administration\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02598272.1997.10800340\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Asian Journal of Public Administration","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02598272.1997.10800340","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Critical View of the Build-Operate-Transfer Privatisation Process in Asia
Since the late 1980s the “build-operate-transfer” concession, or BOT, has become a popular option in Asia for infrastructural privatisation. The experiences of several years suggest that BOT schemes are by nature too complex and fragile, and too highly prone to politicisation, to enable governments in developing countries to achieve the quick, efficient, and privately financed supply of infrastructure as intended by this method of privatisation. Across Asia the number of unqualified BOT successes has been few. A much greater number of attempted projects has been characterised by lengthy delays, chronic disputes, and frequently, failure to ever get underway. Even in the case of those which do proceed, the state often fails to attain its principal goals.