{"title":"其他-关于本金和道德风险","authors":"Swapnendu Banerjee, Mainak Sarkar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2294347","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an ‘inequity- averse’ principal compared to a ‘status seeking’ principal.","PeriodicalId":307125,"journal":{"name":"Institutional & Transition Economics Policy Paper Series","volume":"325 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Other-Regarding Principal and Moral Hazard\",\"authors\":\"Swapnendu Banerjee, Mainak Sarkar\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2294347\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an ‘inequity- averse’ principal compared to a ‘status seeking’ principal.\",\"PeriodicalId\":307125,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Institutional & Transition Economics Policy Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"325 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-07-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Institutional & Transition Economics Policy Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2294347\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Institutional & Transition Economics Policy Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2294347","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an ‘inequity- averse’ principal compared to a ‘status seeking’ principal.
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