向着安全内核驱动接口发展的操作系统内核

Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI:10.1145/3593856.3595914

A. Burtsev, Vikram Narayanan, Yongzhe Huang, Kaiming Huang, Gang Tan, T. Jaeger

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的工作探讨了开发安全内核驱动程序接口的挑战，该接口旨在保护内核免受孤立的内核扩展的影响。我们首先分析了当前隔离框架中存在的一系列可能的攻击向量。然后，我们提出了一种新的方法来构建安全隔离边界，该边界以起源于安全操作系统的思想为中心:隔离堆和单一所有权。

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Evolving Operating System Kernels Towards Secure Kernel-Driver Interfaces

Our work explores the challenge of developing secure kernel-driver interfaces designed to protect the kernel from isolated kernel extensions. We first analyze a range of possible attack vectors that exist in current isolation frameworks. Then, we suggest a new approach to building secure isolation boundaries centered around ideas that originate in safe operating systems: isolation of heaps and single ownership.

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Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems

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