私募股权收购中目标CEO留任是否会损害目标股东?

L. Bargeron, Frederik Schlingemann, C. Zutter, René M. Stulz
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引用次数: 9

摘要

尽管人们普遍担心,当收购方是私募股权公司时,收购方保留目标CEO会损害目标股东的利益,但对私募股权收购方来说,保留目标CEO也可能是有价值的,从而可能使股东受益。我们发现,当收购方为私募股权公司时,CEO留任不会损害目标股东的利益。事实上,我们的研究表明,在私募股权公司的收购中,表现更好的CEO更有可能被保留下来,与不被保留CEO相比,保留CEO的情况下,目标股东能额外获得收购前公司价值的10%至23%。相比之下,运营公司收购目标的股东不会从CEO留任中受益。最后,我们没有发现证据表明,在保留首席执行官的私募股权收购之前,目标公司的价值被人为压低了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does Target CEO Retention in Acquisitions Involving Private Equity Acquirers Harm Target Shareholders?
While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by the acquirer harms target shareholders when the acquirer is a private equity firm, CEO retention can also be valuable to private equity acquirers, and hence potentially benefit shareholders. We find that CEO retention does not harm target shareholders when the acquirer is a private equity firm. In fact, we show that, in acquisitions by private equity firms, better performing CEOs are more likely to be retained and target shareholders gain an additional 10% to 23% of pre-acquisition firm value when the CEO is retained compared to when the CEO is not retained. In contrast, shareholders of targets acquired by operating companies do not benefit from CEO retention. Finally, we find no evidence that the target's value is artificially depressed ahead of a private equity acquisition where the CEO is retained.
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