云中的Linux容器的实用Intel SGX设置

D. Tian, Joseph I. Choi, Grant Hernandez, Patrick Traynor, Kevin R. B. Butler
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引用次数: 15

摘要

由于性能接近本机,Linux容器正在成为云计算的事实上的平台。虽然已经提出了利用英特尔SGX来保护云环境中的应用程序和容器的各种解决方案,但大多数云运营商尚未将SGX作为服务提供。这可能是由于来自云提供商和用户的许多安全性、可伸缩性和可用性问题。云运营商担心非官方sdk的安全保证、对容器内远程认证的有限支持、Enclave Page Cache (EPC)的有限物理内存使其难以支持数百个Enclave,以及恶意用户对EPC的潜在DoS攻击。与此同时,最终用户需要小心地进行程序分区,以减少TCB,并调整遗留应用程序以使用SGX。我们注意到,从操作系统到应用层,这些问题大多是基础设施不完整的结果。我们用lxcsgx解决了这些问题,它允许SGX应用程序在容器内运行,同时还:为容器化的应用程序启用SGX远程认证,在每个容器的基础上实施EPC内存使用控制,提供使用SGX扩展遗留应用程序的通用软件TPM,并支持使用GCC插件进行分区。然后,我们使用软件TPM和SGX分区改造Nginx/OpenSSL和Memcached,以防御已知和潜在的攻击。由于每个enclave的EPC占用空间很小,我们能够运行多达100个容器化的Memcached实例,而无需进行EPC交换。我们的评估显示,lxcsgx引入的开销对于简单的SGX应用程序来说小于6.9%,对于Nginx/OpenSSL来说小于9.5%,对于容器化的Memcached来说小于20.9%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Practical Intel SGX Setting for Linux Containers in the Cloud
With close to native performance, Linux containers are becoming the de facto platform for cloud computing. While various solutions have been proposed to secure applications and containers in the cloud environment by leveraging Intel SGX, most cloud operators do not yet offer SGX as a service. This is likely due to a number of security, scalability, and usability concerns coming from both cloud providers and users. Cloud operators worry about the security guarantees of unofficial SDKs, limited support for remote attestation within containers, limited physical memory for the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) making it difficult to support hundreds of enclaves, and potential DoS attacks against EPC by malicious users. Meanwhile, end users need to worry about careful program partitioning to reduce the TCB and adapting legacy applications to use SGX. We note that most of these concerns are the result of an incomplete infrastructure, from the OS to the application layer. We address these concerns with lxcsgx, which allows SGX applications to run inside containers while also: enabling SGX remote attestation for containerized applications, enforcing EPC memory usage control on a per-container basis, providing a general software TPM using SGX to augment legacy applications, and supporting partitioning with a GCC plugin. We then retrofit Nginx/OpenSSL and Memcached using the software TPM and SGX partitioning to defend against known and potential attacks. Thanks to the small EPC footprint of each enclave, we are able to run up to 100 containerized Memcached instances without EPC swapping. Our evaluation shows the overhead introduced by lxcsgx is less than 6.9% for simple SGX applications, 9.5% for Nginx/OpenSSL, and 20.9% for containerized Memcached.
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