Litigating Regionalism in Italy: the Constitutional Court and the Dynamics of the Territorial Constitution

Whether Italy is a quasi-federal system, or a decentralized unitary state is a matter of scholarly disagreement.1 Undoubtedly, the answer to this question depends on the criteria applied when ascribing Italy to either taxonomy. As it lacks a chamber representing regions at the national level,2 for instance, U.S.-related approaches to federalism rank Italy among non-federal jurisdictions. Such uncertainty suggests we reappraise Italian regionalism from an alternative perspective. This article focuses indeed on the dynamics of the Italian constitution, as well as on the actors that allow them to evolve, in order to grasp its most relevant features. Beginning with the dynamics, these revolve around the concept of ‘territorial constitution’, which points to the geography of federal arrangements, i.e. the governance through constituent units. In federal arrangements, the vertical distribution of powers is complemented by other forces, such as territorial interests, which are allocated within regional boundaries and demarcated on a geographical basis.3 The territorial constitution permits us to sidestep the objections that arise under traditional, and formalistic, approaches to federal studies. Not only is it shared by federalising and decentralising processes, but it has also played a pivotal role in those processes not included among mature or emergent federations.4 Italy certainly has a territorial constitution, since the distribution of powers intermingles with interests that are geographically allocated within regional boundaries. Legislative, administrative, and financial responsibilities are constitutionally assigned to regions so that these must meet the needs of their political communities.5