电动汽车公共充电市场的分层博弈

Yue Yu, Tiecheng Song, Chunxia Su, Xiao Tang, Zhu Han
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文对电动汽车公共充电市场进行了研究,重点研究了基于时间的异构充电站定价机制和电动汽车的充电站分配机制。因此,我们开发了一个分层博弈来分析CSs和ev之间的相互作用,然后将其表述为具有均衡约束的均衡问题(EPEC)。在本文提出的博弈中,CSs作为上层的领导者,制定充电价格,电动汽车作为下层的追随者,决定充电行为。在底层,我们提出了一个CS分配的匹配博弈框架。在上层,我们采用基于块坐标下降法(BCD)的算法来解决CSs的定价问题。仿真结果表明,我们提出的框架显著提高了CSs的收益和电动汽车的效用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hierarchical Game for Electric Vehicle Public Charging Market
In this paper, we investigate the electric vehicle (EV) public charging market and especially focus on the time-based pricing mechanism for heterogeneous charging stations (CSs) and the CS allocation mechanism for EVs. As such, we develop a hierarchical game to analyze the interaction between the CSs and the EVs and then formulate it as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). In the proposed game, the CSs act as the leaders who set the charging price at the upper layer and the EVs act as the followers who determine the charging behaviors at the lower layer. At the lower layer, we propose a matching game framework for the CS allocation. At the upper layer, we adopt an algorithm based on the block coordinate descent (BCD) method to solve the pricing problem for CSs. Simulation results show that our proposed framework significantly increases the revenue for the CSs and the utility for the EVs.
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