检查多租户fpga位流中的电级安全威胁

Dennis R. E. Gnad, Sascha Rapp, Jonas Krautter, M. Tahoori
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引用次数: 21

摘要

第三方可以部分访问FPGA结构的多租户FPGA,在云和可重构soc中是一种不断上升的使用趋势。正如最近的研究所示,这导致了fpga中的新型攻击。这些攻击可以通过公共电力输送网络在电气层面上运行,这使得它们很难被隔离。因此,可以利用软件控制的FPGA配置来插入硬件木马,从而影响整个系统的安全性。攻击可以分为故障攻击和侧信道攻击,要么主动地操纵系统,要么悄悄地提取秘密信息。在本文中,我们展示了针对这些基于电压波动的攻击的第一次尝试,通过分析FPGA的恶意逻辑比特流,基本上实现了FPGA反病毒。通过扩展商业和开源工具的组合,我们提供了一种检查比特流是否存在潜在恶意结构的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Checking for Electrical Level Security Threats in Bitstreams for Multi-tenant FPGAs
Multi-tenant FPGAs, in which 3rd parties have partial access to the FPGA fabric, are a rising usage trend in cloud and reconfigurable SoCs. This gives rise to new types of attacks in FPGAs, as shown in recent studies. These attacks can operate on the electrical level through the common power delivery network, making them very hard to isolate. Thus, software-controlled FPGA configuration can be exploited to insert hardware trojans, impacting the security of the entire system. The attacks can be separated into fault and side-channel attacks to either actively manipulate a system or quietly extract secret information. In this paper, we show the first attempt of countermeasures against these voltage fluctuation based attacks, by analyzing FPGA bitstreams for malicious logic, basically implementing an FPGA antivirus. We provide a way to check bitstreams for potentially malicious structures, by extending a combination of commercial and open-source tools.
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