Zhao Chen, Zhikuo Liu, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, Daniel Yi Xu
{"title":"中国企业所得税减免刺激研发投资","authors":"Zhao Chen, Zhikuo Liu, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, Daniel Yi Xu","doi":"10.1257/AER.20191758","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or “notch.” Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spillovers justify the program from a welfare perspective. (JEL D22, D24, H25, O14, O32, P31, P35)","PeriodicalId":320323,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"166","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China\",\"authors\":\"Zhao Chen, Zhikuo Liu, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, Daniel Yi Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/AER.20191758\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or “notch.” Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spillovers justify the program from a welfare perspective. (JEL D22, D24, H25, O14, O32, P31, P35)\",\"PeriodicalId\":320323,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"166\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20191758\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Research (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20191758","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China
We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or “notch.” Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spillovers justify the program from a welfare perspective. (JEL D22, D24, H25, O14, O32, P31, P35)