信息通信技术与电力基础设施安全风险管理的博弈论模型

Z. Ismail, J. Leneutre, D. Bateman, Lin Chen
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在智能电网中,通信基础设施是电力系统管理和控制的关键要素。通信基础设施可能包括使用现成易受攻击的操作系统的设备,有可能增加电力系统的攻击面。通信与电力系统之间的相互依存关系使得对整体安全风险的管理成为一项具有挑战性的任务。在本文中,我们通过提出一个数学模型来识别和强化电力系统中使用的最关键的通信设备来解决这个问题。利用非合作博弈论,我们模拟了攻击者和防御者之间的互动。我们推导出所需的最小防御资源和防御者的最优策略,使电力系统的风险最小化。最后,通过实例分析验证了模型的正确性和有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Game-Theoretical Model for Security Risk Management of Interdependent ICT and Electrical Infrastructures
The communication infrastructure is a key element for management and control of the power system in the smart grid. The communication infrastructure, which can include equipment using off-the-shelf vulnerable operating systems, has the potential to increase the attack surface of the power system. The interdependency between the communication and the power system renders the management of the overall security risk a challenging task. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting a mathematical model for identifying and hardening the most critical communication equipment used in the power system. Using non-cooperative game theory, we model interactions between an attacker and a defender. We derive the minimum defense resources required and the optimal strategy of the defender that minimizes the risk on the power system. Finally, we evaluate the correctness and the efficiency of our model via a case study.
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