基于深度学习的车辆边缘计算资源分配最优拍卖

Zhenwei Yang, Ziyuan Zhang, Peng Nie
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引用次数: 1

摘要

车载边缘计算技术将车联网从云计算扩展到边缘计算,使车联网能够以低延迟和低带宽消耗成本支持自动驾驶、高清视频、导航规划等车载应用。由于边缘计算节点的部署成本和维护成本较高,为了提高服务提供商的收入,鼓励边缘计算服务提供商部署计算节点,有必要设计边缘计算服务提供商的激励机制。拍卖是一种有效的激励设计方案。本文设计了一种最优拍卖机制,使边缘计算服务提供商的收益最大化,保证了个体合理性和激励兼容性这两个重要属性,保证了资源配置的可行性和有效利用。具体而言,我们设计了车联网环境下边缘计算服务提供商定价与分配的系统模型,将车联网环境下的资源最优拍卖问题转化为带约束的最优拍卖数学规划模型。并设计了基于神经网络的匹配算法、分配算法和价格计算算法。最后,对算法进行了实验和分析。仿真结果表明,该方案在收益和资源利用率方面都优于VCG算法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Deep-Learning-Based Optimal Auction for Vehicular Edge Computing Resource Allocation
The vehicular edge computing technology extends the Internet of Vehicles(IoV) from cloud computing to edge computing, enabling IoV to support in-vehicle applications such as autonomous driving, high-definition video, and navigation planning with low latency and low bandwidth consumption costs. Due to the high deployment cost and maintenance cost of edge computing nodes, to improve the revenue of service providers and encourage edge computing service providers to deploy computing nodes, it is necessary to design an incentive mechanism for edge computing service providers. Auctions are an effective incentive design solution. This paper designs an optimal auction mechanism to maximize the revenue of edge computing service providers, which ensures the two important attributes of individual rationality and incentive compatibility and ensures the feasibility of allocation and efficient use of resources. Specifically, we designed a system model for pricing and allocating edge computing service providers in the Internet of Vehicles environment, and transformed the optimal auction problem of resources under the Internet of Vehicles into a mathematical programming model of the optimal auction with constraints. And designed a matching algorithm, allocation algorithm, and price calculation algorithm based on a neural network. Finally, we experiment and analyze the algorithm. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme is superior to the VCG algorithm in terms of revenue and resource utilization.
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