Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau, Katsushi Suzuki
{"title":"股东福利和公司价值","authors":"Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau, Katsushi Suzuki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2615777","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm’s products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shareholder Perks and Firm Value\",\"authors\":\"Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau, Katsushi Suzuki\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2615777\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm’s products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":429515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2615777\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2615777","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm’s products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.