投资行业的实益所有权:击退匿名资本的策略

Andres Knobel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目前对投资业和证券交易的监管主要侧重于保护投资者和维持投资和证券市场的健全。虽然金融机构和其他中介机构通常也必须执行客户尽职调查和反洗钱程序,以防止非法资金流动,但支撑投资行业和证券交易的保密性,严重破坏了解决逃税、腐败和洗钱问题的措施。投资行业和证券交易的主要保密问题是,没有任何一方能够获得单个所有权链的全貌,这意味着没有人完全知道谁拥有什么。在最好的情况下,一些当事人可以获得部分信息。最近两项提高透明度的举措改善了投资行业的状况,但效果甚微。许多国家,尤其是欧盟国家,已开始建立受益所有权登记制度,公司、信托、合伙企业和其他法律工具必须披露其“受益所有人”,即最终拥有、控制或受益于法律工具的个人。然而,投资实体(以及在证券交易所上市的公司,其股份可能由投资实体作为基础金融资产持有)在许多情况下,无论是在法律上还是在实践中,都被排除在这些新的受益所有权登记的范围之外。另一个透明度方面的突破是经合组织关于自动交换信息的共同报告标准(CRS)。然而,许多漏洞和豁免使新标准无法真正有效地解决投资行业和证券交易的保密问题。尽管存在许多漏洞和豁免,但当CRS确实适用于投资行业时,它仅涵盖有关投资实体的价值和收入的信息。它不收集投资者通过投资实体持有的基础证券的信息。这使得当局不可能发现错报或少报。为了解决这些保密问题,对投资行业和证券交易的保密最全面的解决方案可能是披露每个直接或间接持有的个人:(i)投资基金的任何权益,(ii)相关金融资产的任何权益(例如在证券交易所上市的公司的股份),以及(iii)个人如何持有这些相关证券,包括所有涉及的中介机构。鉴于目前的超快速交易趋势,证券可能只持有几秒钟,所有权可以在工作日结束时报告(仅确定在每个工作日结束时持有投资基金和基础证券的每项权益的最后一个最终投资者)。此外,这种对最终投资者及其受益所有人(个人最终投资者)的全面识别应该包括取代综合账户(汇集来自许多不同投资者的资金),并在最终投资者受益所有人层面采用隔离账户。为了使其范围更全面,应降低法人的受益所有权门槛(目前为“超过25%”的所有权),从而要求任何持有投资基金或金融资产权益的个人(例如持有苹果公司的一股)注册为受益所有人。通过识别每个至少持有一股或一单位权益的个人,就有可能解释世界上(或至少在一个给定市场上)每一项基础金融资产和投资基金的每一项权益。每一个现有投资基金和每一项潜在金融资产的详细所有权信息,将确保不会出现少报或重复报告金融资产的情况(以防止逃避所得税、资本利得税或试图获得非法退税)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Beneficial Ownership in the Investment Industry: A Strategy to Roll Back Anonymous Capital
Current regulation of the investment industry and securities trading primarily focuses on protecting investors and maintaining the soundness of the investment and securities market. While financial institutions and other intermediaries are usually also bound to perform customer due diligence and anti-money laundering procedures to prevent illicit financial flows, the secrecy underpinning the investment industry and securities trading significantly undermines measures to address tax evasion, corruption and money laundering. The main secrecy problem in the investment industry and securities trading is that no single party has access to a full picture of individual chains of ownership, meaning nobody fully knows who owns what. At best, some parties have access to partial information.

Two recent transparency advancements improved the investment industry’s situation, but only marginally. Many countries, especially in the EU, have started to establish beneficial ownership registries, where companies, trusts, partnerships and other legal vehicles have to disclose their “beneficial owners”, the individuals who ultimately own, control or benefit from a legal vehicle. However, investment entities (as well as companies listed on a stock exchange, whose shares may be held by investment entities as underlying financial assets) are in many cases being excluded from the scope of these new beneficial ownership registries, either by law or in practice.

The other transparency breakthrough is the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchange of information. However, many loopholes and exemptions prevent the new standard from being truly effective at solving the secrecy problem of the investment industry and securities trading. Notwithstanding the many loopholes and exemptions, when the CRS does apply to the investment industry, it only covers information about the value and income from investment entities. It does not collect information on the underlying securities held by investors through investment entities. This makes it impossible for authorities to detect misreporting or underreporting.

To address these secrecy problems, the most comprehensive solution to the secrecy underpinning the investment industry and securities trading could be to disclose every individual that directly or indirectly holds: (i) any interest in an investment fund, (ii) any interest in an underlying financial asset (eg a share in a company listed on a stock exchange), and (iii) how the individual holds these underlying securities, including all intermediaries involved. Given the current trend of super-fast trading where securities may be held for just a few seconds, ownership could be reported regarding the situation at the end of the business day (identifying only the last end-investors who held each interest in the investment fund and in the underlying security at the end of each business day). In addition, this comprehensive identification of the end-investor and its beneficial owner (the individual end-investor) should involve replacing omnibus accounts (that pool together money from many different investors) and employ segregated accounts at the end-investor beneficial ownership level. To be comprehensive in its scope, beneficial ownership thresholds for legal persons (currently at “more than 25%” of ownership) should be lowered so as to require any individual holding any interest in an investment fund or in a financial asset (eg holding one share in Apple) to be registered as a beneficial owner. By identifying every individual holding at least one share or unit of interest it would be possible to account for every underlying financial asset, and every interest in an investment fund in the world (or at least in a given market). This granular ownership detail about every existing investment fund and every underlying financial asset would ensure that there is no case of underreporting or double reporting of financial assets (to prevent evading income tax, capital gains tax, or trying to obtain illegal tax refunds).
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