Antoine Bouvet, Nicolas Bruneau, A. Facon, S. Guilley, Damien Marion
{"title":"把你的二进制文件给我,如果泄露了我会告诉你","authors":"Antoine Bouvet, Nicolas Bruneau, A. Facon, S. Guilley, Damien Marion","doi":"10.1109/DTIS.2018.8368582","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present a method to identify side-channel information leakage of a cryptosystem software implementation, which is performed at the binary level, and needs only a debugger. Using a new resynchronization method based on the control flow, leaking instructions are retrieved with only few traces and without leakage model. Advantageously this methodology is target agnostic, finding the side-channel leakages without the need to know how the software will be used.","PeriodicalId":328650,"journal":{"name":"2018 13th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS)","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Give me your binary, I'll tell you if it leaks\",\"authors\":\"Antoine Bouvet, Nicolas Bruneau, A. Facon, S. Guilley, Damien Marion\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DTIS.2018.8368582\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we present a method to identify side-channel information leakage of a cryptosystem software implementation, which is performed at the binary level, and needs only a debugger. Using a new resynchronization method based on the control flow, leaking instructions are retrieved with only few traces and without leakage model. Advantageously this methodology is target agnostic, finding the side-channel leakages without the need to know how the software will be used.\",\"PeriodicalId\":328650,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2018 13th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS)\",\"volume\":\"213 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-04-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2018 13th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DTIS.2018.8368582\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 13th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DTIS.2018.8368582","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we present a method to identify side-channel information leakage of a cryptosystem software implementation, which is performed at the binary level, and needs only a debugger. Using a new resynchronization method based on the control flow, leaking instructions are retrieved with only few traces and without leakage model. Advantageously this methodology is target agnostic, finding the side-channel leakages without the need to know how the software will be used.