{"title":"主权游戏的未来","authors":"Ryan D. Griffiths","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754746.003.0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concludes with a theoretical and prescriptive analysis of the future of the sovereignty game. It highlights several past configurations of the international recognition regime, and identifies three potential future configurations that focus on remedial rights, primary rights, and state consent. The chapter also discusses the comparative statics of each configuration — that is, the expected frequency of secession, conflict, and the fitness of new states as a result of the regime. The chapter then shifts to a more prescriptive analysis of how the game might be improved. It argues, with caution, for the merits of a regime that emphasizes consent-based democratized secession, in which independence movements have formal institutional access but where the conditions for political exit are nevertheless hard to reach. The resulting benefits for the sovereignty game are that conflict would be reduced both within and between states. Ultimately, the chapter details the potential critiques of the study, noting that the proposal says nothing about the importance of a remedial right and maintained that it is quite difficult to implement.","PeriodicalId":414134,"journal":{"name":"Secession and the Sovereignty Game","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Future of the Sovereignty Game\",\"authors\":\"Ryan D. Griffiths\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501754746.003.0012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter concludes with a theoretical and prescriptive analysis of the future of the sovereignty game. It highlights several past configurations of the international recognition regime, and identifies three potential future configurations that focus on remedial rights, primary rights, and state consent. The chapter also discusses the comparative statics of each configuration — that is, the expected frequency of secession, conflict, and the fitness of new states as a result of the regime. The chapter then shifts to a more prescriptive analysis of how the game might be improved. It argues, with caution, for the merits of a regime that emphasizes consent-based democratized secession, in which independence movements have formal institutional access but where the conditions for political exit are nevertheless hard to reach. The resulting benefits for the sovereignty game are that conflict would be reduced both within and between states. Ultimately, the chapter details the potential critiques of the study, noting that the proposal says nothing about the importance of a remedial right and maintained that it is quite difficult to implement.\",\"PeriodicalId\":414134,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Secession and the Sovereignty Game\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Secession and the Sovereignty Game\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754746.003.0012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Secession and the Sovereignty Game","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754746.003.0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter concludes with a theoretical and prescriptive analysis of the future of the sovereignty game. It highlights several past configurations of the international recognition regime, and identifies three potential future configurations that focus on remedial rights, primary rights, and state consent. The chapter also discusses the comparative statics of each configuration — that is, the expected frequency of secession, conflict, and the fitness of new states as a result of the regime. The chapter then shifts to a more prescriptive analysis of how the game might be improved. It argues, with caution, for the merits of a regime that emphasizes consent-based democratized secession, in which independence movements have formal institutional access but where the conditions for political exit are nevertheless hard to reach. The resulting benefits for the sovereignty game are that conflict would be reduced both within and between states. Ultimately, the chapter details the potential critiques of the study, noting that the proposal says nothing about the importance of a remedial right and maintained that it is quite difficult to implement.