{"title":"投射期望效用:一个主观的表述","authors":"Pierfrancesco La Mura","doi":"10.1145/1562814.1562840","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by classical decision-theoretic paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961), we introduce a projective generalization of expected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical generalization of probability theory. The resulting decision theory accommodates the paradoxes, while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In particular, every finite game within this larger class of preferences still has an equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Projective expected utility: a subjective formulation\",\"authors\":\"Pierfrancesco La Mura\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1562814.1562840\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Motivated by classical decision-theoretic paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961), we introduce a projective generalization of expected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical generalization of probability theory. The resulting decision theory accommodates the paradoxes, while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In particular, every finite game within this larger class of preferences still has an equilibrium.\",\"PeriodicalId\":118894,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-07-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1562814.1562840\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1562814.1562840","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Projective expected utility: a subjective formulation
Motivated by classical decision-theoretic paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961), we introduce a projective generalization of expected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical generalization of probability theory. The resulting decision theory accommodates the paradoxes, while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In particular, every finite game within this larger class of preferences still has an equilibrium.
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