{"title":"关于世界各地的薪酬法律、高管薪酬、薪酬切片和公司价值的看法","authors":"Ricardo Correa, Ugur Lel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2328678","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of about 90,000 observations from 38 countries over the 2001-2012 period, we provide three novel findings regarding say on pay (SoP) laws. First, we find robust evidence that SoP laws reduce CEO pay growth rates at firms. Second, such laws decrease the portion of total top management pay captured by CEOs. Firm values are higher following SoP laws in part because of this reduction in managerial pay inequality. Third, mandatory SoP laws only affect the CEO pay growth rates whereas advisory SoP laws influence various aspects of executive pay policies. These results are robust to instrumental variable estimation and nearest neighbor matching methods.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Value around the World\",\"authors\":\"Ricardo Correa, Ugur Lel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2328678\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using a sample of about 90,000 observations from 38 countries over the 2001-2012 period, we provide three novel findings regarding say on pay (SoP) laws. First, we find robust evidence that SoP laws reduce CEO pay growth rates at firms. Second, such laws decrease the portion of total top management pay captured by CEOs. Firm values are higher following SoP laws in part because of this reduction in managerial pay inequality. Third, mandatory SoP laws only affect the CEO pay growth rates whereas advisory SoP laws influence various aspects of executive pay policies. These results are robust to instrumental variable estimation and nearest neighbor matching methods.\",\"PeriodicalId\":228319,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"20\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2328678\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2328678","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Value around the World
Using a sample of about 90,000 observations from 38 countries over the 2001-2012 period, we provide three novel findings regarding say on pay (SoP) laws. First, we find robust evidence that SoP laws reduce CEO pay growth rates at firms. Second, such laws decrease the portion of total top management pay captured by CEOs. Firm values are higher following SoP laws in part because of this reduction in managerial pay inequality. Third, mandatory SoP laws only affect the CEO pay growth rates whereas advisory SoP laws influence various aspects of executive pay policies. These results are robust to instrumental variable estimation and nearest neighbor matching methods.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
