{"title":"竞业禁止协议、工资与效率:来自巴西足球的理论与证据","authors":"Bernardo Guimaraes, J. Pessoa, V. Ponczek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3942192","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a model to study non-compete agreements and evaluate their quantitative effects. We explore an exogenous policy change that removed non-compete clauses for Brazilian footballers, the Pele Act of 1998. The Act raised players' lifetime income but changed the wage profile in a heterogeneous way, reducing young players' salaries. We structurally estimate the model's parameters by matching wages and turnover profiles in the post Act period. By changing the parameter capturing the non-compete friction, we match the changes in the age-earnings profile. The bulk of income gains is due to distributional forces, with efficiency gains playing a minor role.","PeriodicalId":210669,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Human Capital eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Non-compete Agreements, Wages and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from Brazilian Football\",\"authors\":\"Bernardo Guimaraes, J. Pessoa, V. Ponczek\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3942192\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a model to study non-compete agreements and evaluate their quantitative effects. We explore an exogenous policy change that removed non-compete clauses for Brazilian footballers, the Pele Act of 1998. The Act raised players' lifetime income but changed the wage profile in a heterogeneous way, reducing young players' salaries. We structurally estimate the model's parameters by matching wages and turnover profiles in the post Act period. By changing the parameter capturing the non-compete friction, we match the changes in the age-earnings profile. The bulk of income gains is due to distributional forces, with efficiency gains playing a minor role.\",\"PeriodicalId\":210669,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Labor: Human Capital eJournal\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Labor: Human Capital eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942192\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Labor: Human Capital eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942192","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-compete Agreements, Wages and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from Brazilian Football
We propose a model to study non-compete agreements and evaluate their quantitative effects. We explore an exogenous policy change that removed non-compete clauses for Brazilian footballers, the Pele Act of 1998. The Act raised players' lifetime income but changed the wage profile in a heterogeneous way, reducing young players' salaries. We structurally estimate the model's parameters by matching wages and turnover profiles in the post Act period. By changing the parameter capturing the non-compete friction, we match the changes in the age-earnings profile. The bulk of income gains is due to distributional forces, with efficiency gains playing a minor role.
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