社会保障的理论与实践(二):效率理论、叙事理论与改革启示

C. Mulligan, Xavier Sala-i-Martin
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引用次数: 42

摘要

166个国家有某种形式的公共养老金。什么经济力量创造和维持老年社会保障作为一个公共项目?Mulligan和Sala-i-Martin(1999)记录了社会保障计划在国际上和历史上的几个共同特征,并探索了社会保障的政治理论。本文讨论了效率理论,该理论将社会保障计划的创建视为对某些市场失灵的完全或部分解决方案。社会保障的效率解释包括“养老福利”、“退休提高生产率以最优管理人力资本外部性”、“最优退休保险”、“浪子父亲问题”、“被误导的凯恩斯主义”、“最优长寿保险”、“政府节约交易成本”和“人力资本投资回报”。我们还分析了四种叙述性的社会保障理论:连锁信理论、劳动块理论、垄断资本主义理论和对私人养老金的次但近乎最优的政策反应理论。将政治和效率方面的解释与国际和历史事实进行比较,并用来推导出用强制储蓄计划取代典型的现收现付制度的含义。大多数解释都表明,强迫储蓄不会增加福利,反而可能会降低福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Security in Theory and Practice (Ii): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform
166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore political' theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the efficiency theories,' which view creation of the SS program as a full or partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the SS as welfare for the elderly', the retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities', optimal retirement insurance', the prodigal father problem', the misguided Keynesian', the optimal longevity insurance', the government economizing transaction costs' and the return on human capital investment'. We also analyze four narrative' theories of social security: the chain letter theory', the lump of labor theory', the monopoly capitalism theory', and the Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory'. The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.
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