CEO工厂制造

Ye Cai, Merih Sevilir, Jun Yang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们发现,1992年至2010年间,在标准普尔1500指数成分股公司中,超过20%的CEO来自36家CEO工厂。来自CEO工厂的CEO,即来自工厂的CEO,在任命公告时的累积异常收益明显高于非工厂的CEO。我们表明,CEO工厂提供了独特的领导力发展机会,通过这些机会,高管们获得了一般的管理技能。在上任的头三年,工厂的ceo们倾向于停止大型的、表现不佳的部门,改善剩余部门的业绩,并在研发上投入大量资金。因此,雇用工厂CEO的公司表现出更好的长期绩效,并给予CEO更高的薪酬。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Made in CEO Factories
We find that over 20% of CEOs appointed at S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2010 came from 36 CEO factories. CEOs originated from CEO factories, factory CEOs, have significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns at the appointment announcement than do non-factory CEOs. We show that CEO factories provide unique leadership development opportunities through which executives acquire general managerial skills. In their first three years, factory CEOs tend to discontinue large, underperforming segments, improve the performance of remaining segments, and invest heavily in R&D. As a result, firms hiring factory CEOs exhibit better long-run performance and award greater CEO compensation.
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