An efficient spectrum management mechanism for cognitive radio networks

The traditional static spectrum access approach, which assigns a fixed portion of the spectrum to a specific license holder for exclusive use, is unable to manage the spectrum efficiently any longer. In an effort to improve the efficiency of its usage, alternative spectrum allocation scenarios are being proposed. One of these technologies is the Dynamic Spectrum Access which enables wireless users to share a wide range of available spectrum in an opportunistic manner. In this paper, we study an architecture for a competitive spectrum exchange marketplace, a theoretic base, and the empirical work for spectrum price formation. The competitive spectrum exchange marketplace architecture considers short term sub-lease of unutilized spectrum bands to different service providers. Our proposed pricing model applies game theory as its mathematical base. The Nash equilibrium point tells the spectrum holders the ideal price values where profit is maximized at the highest level of customer satisfaction. Our empirical results prove that the service providers' demand depends on the price and QoS of that band as well as the price and QoS offering of its competitors.