{"title":"存在模型误差和状态估计的协调变结构切换攻击","authors":"Shan Liu, D. Kundur, T. Zourntos, K. Butler-Purry","doi":"10.1109/SmartGridComm.2012.6486003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Coordinated variable structure switching attacks have been recently proposed as a class of cyber-physical attacks on future smart grid systems. In the traditional formulation of this assault, the opponent is assumed to have a local model of the power system and knowledge of the state (rotor angle and frequency) of a target generator under attack. In this paper, we study the performance of this attack when the opponent has imperfect knowledge of the local system dynamics and partial knowledge of the generator state. In such a situation, we demonstrate how the attacker can make use of Luenberger-based state estimation techniques that are robust to model error to still achieve power system disruption via rotor angle instability.","PeriodicalId":143915,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coordinated variable structure switching attack in the presence of model error and state estimation\",\"authors\":\"Shan Liu, D. Kundur, T. Zourntos, K. Butler-Purry\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SmartGridComm.2012.6486003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Coordinated variable structure switching attacks have been recently proposed as a class of cyber-physical attacks on future smart grid systems. In the traditional formulation of this assault, the opponent is assumed to have a local model of the power system and knowledge of the state (rotor angle and frequency) of a target generator under attack. In this paper, we study the performance of this attack when the opponent has imperfect knowledge of the local system dynamics and partial knowledge of the generator state. In such a situation, we demonstrate how the attacker can make use of Luenberger-based state estimation techniques that are robust to model error to still achieve power system disruption via rotor angle instability.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143915,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"18\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2012.6486003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2012.6486003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Coordinated variable structure switching attack in the presence of model error and state estimation
Coordinated variable structure switching attacks have been recently proposed as a class of cyber-physical attacks on future smart grid systems. In the traditional formulation of this assault, the opponent is assumed to have a local model of the power system and knowledge of the state (rotor angle and frequency) of a target generator under attack. In this paper, we study the performance of this attack when the opponent has imperfect knowledge of the local system dynamics and partial knowledge of the generator state. In such a situation, we demonstrate how the attacker can make use of Luenberger-based state estimation techniques that are robust to model error to still achieve power system disruption via rotor angle instability.