用Haven屏蔽不受信任云的应用程序

Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, G. Hunt
{"title":"用Haven屏蔽不受信任云的应用程序","authors":"Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, G. Hunt","doi":"10.1145/2799647","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.","PeriodicalId":318554,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"770","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven\",\"authors\":\"Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, G. Hunt\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2799647\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.\",\"PeriodicalId\":318554,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-10-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"770\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2799647\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2799647","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 770

摘要

今天的云计算基础设施需要大量的信任。云用户依靠提供商的员工及其全球分布的软件/硬件平台来避免暴露其任何私人数据。我们介绍了屏蔽执行的概念,它保护程序及其数据在其运行的平台(即云运营商的操作系统、VM和固件)上的机密性和完整性。我们的原型Haven是第一个在普通操作系统(Windows)和普通硬件上实现未修改遗留应用程序(包括SQL Server和Apache)屏蔽执行的系统。Haven利用英特尔SGX的硬件保护来防御特权代码和物理攻击,如内存探测,还解决了执行未修改的遗留二进制文件和保护它们免受恶意主机攻击的双重挑战。这项工作推动了SGX规范最近的变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信