The Malayan Union and the Historians

J. de V. Allen's recently published monograph on the Malayan Union will have served its purpose if it redirects the attention of historians to 'an event whose importance was only possibly exceeded by the things which seem to crowd it out of the historical books ? the Japanese occupation of 1943-1945, the emergency which began in 1948, and the declaration of indepen dence from Britain in 1957'.1 In his often fascinating elaboration of what is essentially the accepted, almost traditional, account of the Malayan Union's demise, Allen argues that the scheme (which provided for the amalgamation of the pre-war Federated and Unfederated Malay States and the crown colonies of Penang and Malacca into a unitary colony which would provide the basis for eventual independence by granting citizenship to the great majority of the existing population) represented a recognition by British planners of the advantages of administrative centralisation, of the permanence of settlement of many Chinese and Indian inhabitants and of the loyal support of the Chinese during the Japanese occupation. The scheme failed because it was deliberately foisted upon the Malay Sultans (who were required to cede their sovereignty) in great haste, because it took inadequate consideration of Malay attitudes and political forms, thus arousing united Malay and ex-Malayan Civil Servant opposition, and because it aroused no interest among the Chinese and Indians. Therefore the Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya, which safe guarded the traditional leadership role of the Sultans, which allayed Malay fears of 'alien' domination and which yet offered 'generous' citizenship rights to the non-Malays. In this manner, so the account goes, a gross error of judgement was rectified and the groundwork laid for progress towards independence.