{"title":"巧合谜题","authors":"C. Dorr, J. Hawthorne, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192846655.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents and discusses a general schema that subsumes a variety of puzzles having to do with the modal behaviour of material objects, some new and some familiar. These puzzles involve ‘Robustness’ premises according to which certain objects of a given kind are counterfactually robust in certain respects; ‘Non-coincidence’ premises according to which distinct objects of that kind are incapable of coinciding, and ‘Non-distinctness’ premises that rule out the scenarios in which actually distinct objects could have been identical; these jointly entail an absurd conclusion.","PeriodicalId":324490,"journal":{"name":"The Bounds of Possibility","volume":"356 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coincidence Puzzles\",\"authors\":\"C. Dorr, J. Hawthorne, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780192846655.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter presents and discusses a general schema that subsumes a variety of puzzles having to do with the modal behaviour of material objects, some new and some familiar. These puzzles involve ‘Robustness’ premises according to which certain objects of a given kind are counterfactually robust in certain respects; ‘Non-coincidence’ premises according to which distinct objects of that kind are incapable of coinciding, and ‘Non-distinctness’ premises that rule out the scenarios in which actually distinct objects could have been identical; these jointly entail an absurd conclusion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":324490,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Bounds of Possibility\",\"volume\":\"356 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Bounds of Possibility\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846655.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Bounds of Possibility","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846655.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter presents and discusses a general schema that subsumes a variety of puzzles having to do with the modal behaviour of material objects, some new and some familiar. These puzzles involve ‘Robustness’ premises according to which certain objects of a given kind are counterfactually robust in certain respects; ‘Non-coincidence’ premises according to which distinct objects of that kind are incapable of coinciding, and ‘Non-distinctness’ premises that rule out the scenarios in which actually distinct objects could have been identical; these jointly entail an absurd conclusion.