金融中介机构持续经营债务

Yueran Ma, J. Scheinkman
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了美国银行控股公司的资产和债务特征。我们表明,金融机构,尤其是大型机构,不仅仅是持有离散资产。服务和持续经营价值很重要,资本市场债务与持续经营价值的对比占总资产的10%至15%,与资本市场债务与离散资产的对比相当。我们发现,相对于非金融企业的类似债务,金融机构对持续经营价值的债务监测较弱。我们认为,监管不力之所以普遍存在,是因为如果这些机构违反契约,债权人无法轻易惩罚或重组它们,这限制了契约的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Going-Concern Debt of Financial Intermediaries
We study asset and debt characteristics of US bank holding companies. We show that financial institutions, especially large institutions, are not just about holding discrete assets. Services and going-concern values are important, and capital market debt against going-concern values accounts for 10% to 15% of total assets, comparable to the volume of capital market debt against discrete assets. We find that financial institutions’ debt against going-concern values has weak monitoring, relative to similar debt among non-financial firms. We argue that weak monitoring prevails because creditors cannot easily punish or restructure these institutions should they violate covenants, which limits covenants’ usefulness.
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