如何销售数据集?数据货币化的定价政策

Sameer Mehta, Milind Dawande, G. Janakiraman, V. Mookerjee
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引用次数: 33

摘要

数据销售者在实践中使用的各种各样的定价政策表明,定价数据集存在重大挑战。数据集的销售——以行-列格式排列,行代表记录,列代表记录的属性——比电话分钟和带宽等信息商品的销售更微妙,因为对买家来说,重要的不仅是数据的数量,还有数据的类型。我们开发了一个实用程序框架,它适用于数据购买者和数据销售者对数据的相应定价。对购买数据集感兴趣的买家有两个方面的私人估值——她最看重的理想记录,以及她对数据集中记录的估值因与她的理想记录不同而衰减的速度。卖方允许单个(和异构)买家过滤数据集并选择他们感兴趣的记录。买方的多维私有信息与记录的内生选择相结合,使得卖方对数据集的最优定价问题具有挑战性。我们建立了一个可处理的模型,并成功地利用其特殊的结构对其进行了分析和数值检验。我们建立的一个关键结论是,在合理的假设下,价格-数量计划是最优的数据销售机制。这样的时间表在数据销售上下文中有微妙的解释,因为买家购买不同的记录集,但是给定数量记录的价格并不取决于买家选择的记录的身份。即使导致价格-数量计划最优性的假设不成立,我们也证明了最优价格-数量计划相对于最优机制提供了一个有吸引力的最坏情况性能保证。此外,我们对最优机制进行了数值求解,并表明两种简单且众所周知的价格-数量计划(两部分定价和两块定价)的实际性能接近最优。我们还通过允许买家过滤数据集来量化对卖家的价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization
The wide variety of pricing policies used in practice by data-sellers suggests that there are significant challenges in pricing datasets. The selling of a dataset -- arranged in a row-column format, where rows represent records and columns represent attributes of the records -- is more nuanced than that of information goods like telephone minutes and bandwidth, in the sense that, for a buyer, it is not only the amount of data that matters but also the type of the data. We develop a utility framework that is appropriate for data-buyers and the corresponding pricing of the data by the data-seller. A buyer interested in purchasing a dataset has private valuations in two aspects -- her ideal record that she values the most, and the rate at which her valuation for the records in the dataset decays as they differ from her ideal record. The seller allows individual (and heterogeneous) buyers to filter the dataset and select the records that are of interest to them. The multi-dimensional private information of the buyers coupled with the endogenous selection of records makes the seller's problem of optimally pricing the dataset a challenging one. We formulate a tractable model and successfully exploit its special structure to examine it both analytically and numerically. A key result we establish is that, under reasonable assumptions, a price-quantity schedule is an optimal data-selling mechanism. Such a schedule has a nuanced interpretation in the data-selling context in that buyers buy different sets of records but the price for a given number of records does not depend on the identity of the records chosen by the buyer. Even when the assumptions leading to the optimality of a price-quantity schedule do not hold, we show that the optimal price-quantity schedule offers an attractive worst-case performance guarantee relative to an optimal mechanism. Further, we numerically solve for the optimal mechanism and show that the actual performance of two simple and well-known price-quantity schedules -- two-part pricing and two-block pricing -- is near-optimal. We also quantify the value to the seller from allowing buyers to filter the dataset.
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