Entertaining as Simulation

[ Abstract ] It is common to distinguish beween the content of a judgment, or the content of an assertion, and the (judicative/assertoric) force which is missing when the content is “merely entertained”. This distinction, however, conflicts with the claim that propositional content is inherently judicative/assertoric (the judicative/assertoric component being what unifies the proposition). This chapter attempts to resolve the tension. All the cases in which a proposition is said to be merely entertained are shown to be cases in which, actually, a forceful act of assertion or judgment, or a forceful state of belief, is simulated. This applies not only to cases like fiction, irony, or supposition, but also to the cases in which a proposition is a part of a more complex proposition. The notion of simulation used here is the same one which “simulation theory” appeals to in connection with activities such as fiction (reading novels, watching movies, etc.), planning, mindreading, pretend play, and hypothetical reasoning.