凯撒轻量级决赛选手对决:ACORN vs Ascon

William Diehl, Farnoud Farahmand, Abubakr Abdulgadir, J. Kaps, K. Gaj
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引用次数: 20

摘要

与联合使用秘密密钥密码和消息身份验证代码相比,经过身份验证的密码有可能节省资源并提高安全性。CAESAR竞赛旨在为多个类别的应用程序选择最合适的身份验证密码,其中包括轻量级用例,其主要标准是资源受限设备中的性能,以及对侧信道攻击(SCA)的易于保护。2018年3月,该类别的两个候选人ACORN和Ascon被选为凯撒竞赛的决赛选手。在本研究中,我们比较了ACORN和Ascon的两种抗sca FPGA实现,其中一组实现的面积消耗几乎相当于事实上的标准AES-GCM,而另一组实现的吞吐量(TP)接近AES-GCM。结果表明,ACORN和Ascon的保护实现面积消耗小于但接近AES-GCM,分别是AES-GCM的23.3倍和2.5倍。同样,TP大于但接近AES-GCM的ACORN和Ascon的实现分别消耗了AES-GCM的18%和74%的面积。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Face-off Between the CAESAR Lightweight Finalists: ACORN vs. Ascon
Authenticated ciphers potentially provide resource savings and security improvements over the joint use of secret-key ciphers and message authentication codes. The CAESAR competition aims to choose the most suitable authenticated ciphers for several categories of applications, including a lightweight use case, for which the primary criteria are performance in resource-constrained devices, and ease of protection against side channel attacks (SCA). In March 2018, two of the candidates from this category, ACORN and Ascon, were selected as CAESAR contest finalists. In this research, we compare two SCA-resistant FPGA implementations of ACORN and Ascon, where one set of implementations has area consumption nearly equivalent to the defacto standard AES-GCM, and the other set has throughput (TP) close to that of AES-GCM. The results show that protected implementations of ACORN and Ascon, with area consumption less than but close to AES-GCM, have 23.3 and 2.5 times, respectively, the TP of AES-GCM. Likewise, implementations of ACORN and Ascon with TP greater than but close to AES-GCM, consume 18% and 74% of the area, respectively, of AES-GCM.
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