有限理性的两阶段预算

N. Pretnar, Christopher Y. Olivola, A. Montgomery
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引用次数: 0

摘要

构建了具有心理会计特征的两阶段预算和有限理性统一理论。心理会计和理性不注意导致第一阶段和第二阶段支出预算之间的行为楔子。因为回顾一个人的财务活动在认知上是昂贵的,消费者可能只会在每个时期重新评估他们支出预算的一部分。支出过剩或不足影响未来的预算和支出决策。我们将潜在贝叶斯推理应用于代理级每周支出数据,以便从结构上估计低收入消费者在预算方面表现出理性约束的程度。我们的研究结果让我们深入了解了消费者对鼓励更有纪律的预算行为的干预措施的反应,比如预算应用程序中的推送通知。如果消费者敏锐地意识到预算失误,他们可能会向上调整预算,以避免过度支出的负效用,从而推动储蓄率和余额下降。以这种方式,提醒消费者预算阈值的推送通知可能会适得其反,实际上会导致预算行为,从长远来看会减少储蓄和财富。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Two-stage Budgeting with Bounded Rationality
We construct a unifying theory of two-stage budgeting and bounded rationality with mental accounting features. Mental accounting and rational inattention induce behavioral wedges between first-stage and second-stage expenditure budgets. Because reviewing one’s financial activities is cognitively costly, consumers might reassess only a subset of their spending budgets every period. Over- or under-spending affects future budgeting and expenditure decisions. We apply latent Bayesian inference to agent-level weekly expenditure data in order to structurally estimate the degree to which low-income consumers appear rationally constrained with respect to budgeting. Our findings provide insight into how consumers may respond to interventions that encourage more disciplined budgeting behavior, like push notifications in budgeting apps. If consumers are acutely aware of budget misses, they may adjust budgets upward to avoid the dis-utility of over-expenditure, driving savings rates and balances downward. In this manner, push notifications that warn consumers about budget thresholds could backfire and actually lead to budgeting behavior that reduces savings and wealth in the long-run.
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